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1	  	  
I. Introduction 
 
 
In the past couple decades, the “rise of China” has become a cultural phenomenon 
in the United States. Pervasive throughout media, business, academics, and politics, a 
fixation on the increasing wealth and power of China is perpetuated by a deep uncertainty 
and fear that is unique to this country. It is unique not because Americans are particularly 
xenophobic, or have historical qualms to face—and certainly not due to geographic 
proximity. In fact, the fear has very little to do with any factors specific to China itself. 
What America sees in a rising China that no other country can see, is replacement. The 
possibility that, benign or otherwise, China may one day supplant the United States as the 
most powerful nation on Earth, is in many ways a threat foremost to American identity. 
What will the United States be if not the leader of the free world? 
This line of thinking raises the questions: what are American leaders doing now to 
prepare for the future? What are their options? What, even, should their goals be? 
Although perhaps a multidisciplinary question, the answers are ultimately brought up in 
political theory and answered in hard policy. This paper attempts to do a bit of both. The 
aim of the following pages is to first explore how these questions are asked and what 
answers are given, and to then decipher what current US leaders are doing about them. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
Internet search giant Google offers an interesting feature that enables its users to 
input various words or terms and generate a graph that displays the relative frequency 
with which their queries are found in published books over time.1 With access to 
hundreds of thousands of books spanning the past several centuries, this tool can be used 
to illustrate linguistic trends that reflect the cultural significance of particular topics as 
they gain and lose the attention of writers and academics. A search for the term “Nazi” 
shows the word appear suddenly around 1930 and shoot up in frequency, while the term 
“the Titanic” displays both the expected spike after 1912 and a slightly larger one in the 
late 1990s. Using this feature to search for terms associated with China’s growing 
prominence, such as “China’s rise,”  “rising China,” “growing China,” and others, reveals 
the magnitude with which this issue has erupted into the English speaking world in the 
past decade and a half. With moderate spikes in the mid-1950s and early 1970s, the 
phrase “China’s rise” has seen a twenty one-fold increase in frequency since it began its 
resurgence in the last decade of the twentieth century. In contrast, the term “Japan’s rise,” 
which saw significant popularity in the decades before and after 1940 and then again 
during the 1980s, has been on a steady downward trend since its peak in 1992. “China’s 
rise” overtook “Japan’s rise” for the first time by the end of the 1990s, and has since 
skyrocketed to over ten times its Japanese counterpart.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 You can explore this tool at: https://books.google.com/ngrams. For this comparison the following terms 
that might show up in discussions of China’s growth were used: “Chin’s rise”, “rising China”, “China’s 
growing”, “China’s expanding”, “growing China”, “China’s increasing”, and simply “China”. 
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While the exact size of these fluctuations should not be given much weight, as the 
frequency of a specific phrase may rise and fall for various reasons, the trends 
demonstrate a marked increase in publications addressing the growth of China. Within 
the realm of international relations theory this influx of attention on China has largely 
dealt with the essential question of how such a rising power will influence the prolonged 
“unipolar moment” enjoyed by the US since the end of the Cold War.2 The root of this 
question has a much deeper history than the recent growth of China, and touches on the 
principles of international relations theory which deal with the dynamic of power in the 
international system. The answer to how the United States should or will react to a rising 
China depends largely on the theoretical assumptions one makes about the nature of 
states and their relationships to one another.  
This chapter will outline the two primary theoretical camps on the issue of a rising 
China and deal specifically with the divergent opinions on how the United States should 
face this developing reality. Although views vary widely on this subject along the 
traditional theoretical spectrum, they have been categorized here as falling either under 
the title of realism or liberalism so as to highlight distinct differences between these two 
approaches. Defining this dichotomy are two divergent understandings on the nature of 
states, their motivations, and the international system. Can sovereign states reconcile 
conflicting interest through cooperation, in the absence of an international arbiter? Are 
power and security the sole drivers of state action? Can interdependence, norms, and 
international institutions overcome the propensity for nations to distrust one another? Are 
the United States and China doomed to a second Cold War, or worse? The answers given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Charles Krauthammer coined the term “unipolar moment” in 1990 before the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union. See: Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70:1 (1990): 23-33. 
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to these crucial questions provide the basic criteria for categorizing the newly grown 
mass of publications on China’s rise. 
It is important to note that the discussion of how the US should react to a rising 
Chinese power does not presuppose a specific view on China’s current or future status. 
There is wide disagreement among scholars both on current comparisons of US and 
Chinese power, as well as the future of Chinese growth. Many argue that China still has a 
long way to go until it presents a real challenge to the US, while others are confident that 
it will collapse internally before ever reaching that point.3 At the same time, there is no 
shortage of doomsayers and alarmist headlines that claim China’s eclipse of American 
power is just over the horizon.4 Regardless of one’s accuracy in predicting the future, the 
sustained high levels of growth in China over the past three decades indicates that, at the 
very least, the gap between US and Chinese power in Asia will continue to shrink for 
some time, and that a future point of rough parity is not unfathomable.  
 
In the Oxford Handbook on International Relations, William Wohlforth points out 
that realism is a way of thinking rather than a single theory; it is an amorphous theoretical 
disposition that extends back centuries, with countless contributors of varying opinions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For discussions of the gap between China and the US see: Joseph Nye, “The Future of American Power,” 
Foreign Affairs 89:6 (2010): 2-12; David Shambaugh, “China Goes Global,” (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 307-316; and “The dragon’s new teeth,” The Economist, Apr. 7, 2012, 
(http://www.economist.com/node/21552193). For arguments on China’s weakness see: Minxin Pei, 
“China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy,” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006): 206-215; and Susan L. Shirk, “China, Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal 
Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise,” (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
4 For a prime example of this view see: Peter Navarro, “Death by China: Confronting the Dragon - A 
Global Call to Action,” (Upper Saddle River, NK: Prentice Hall, 2011). While Navarro’s writing is quite 
sensationalist, it reflects a more widely accepted sentiment that China is rising at the expense of the US. 
For a more palatable view on China’s challenge to the US see: Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge to 
US Hegemony,” Current History 107:705 (2008).  
5	  	  
However, despite the many forms of realism, Wohlforth puts forward four “central 
propositions” that are consistent throughout different definitions: groupism, the idea that 
society is dependent on the collective efforts of humans that form themselves into groups, 
and that the resulting “in-group cohesion” is the source of conflict between groups (in 
most cases “groups” are construed as states, which become the unit of analysis of 
realism); egoism is the central principle that people and the groups they form themselves 
into act out of narrow self-interest; anarchy, defined by the absence of authority over 
states; and power politics, of which Wohlforth states “the intersection of groupism and 
egoism in an environment of anarchy makes international relations, regrettably, largely as 
politics of power and security.”5 As Wohlforth goes on to elaborate, one of the primary 
realist arguments to follow from these propositions—and in particular the fourth one—is 
that international relations is dominated by the few most powerful and resource-rich 
states, and therefore shifts in the distribution of power among these states should be 
closely analyzed.6 Although realists’ views on the rise of China and how the US should 
respond are as diverse as the school of thought they subscribe to, the overarching 
opinions discussed here are as follows: the rise of China is a result of the international 
structure and the forces it places on states; an increase in Chinese power threatens the 
current US position, regardless of the intentions of either party; China as an equal power 
could not coexist with the current US role as sole hegemon, and an attempt by the United 
States to maintain the status quo will inevitably lead to conflict.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 William Wohlforth, “Realism” in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-
Smit and Duncan Snidal, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), Kindle Edition: location 3338. 
6 Ibid. Location 3372. 
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 The rise of China presents a textbook case of power politics for realist 
thinkers. As China develops and amasses its natural resources and military strength, the 
propositions of egoism, anarchy, and power politics come in to play. Realist observers 
such as Christopher Layne point to these principles to explain that an increase in Chinese 
power is not only a direct challenge to American hegemony in Asia, but is in fact an 
inevitable one.7 Layne argues that since each state can be expected to act in its own self-
interest (egoism), and anarchy dictates that states can only rely on their own power in a 
self-help system, “states must always be concerned that others will use increased relative 
capabilities against them.”8 This necessary paranoia leads “eligible states”9 to seek great 
power status in a unipolar world by balancing their power against the hegemon.10 It also 
places significance on the relative capabilities of potential competitors, which thereby 
casts international politics as a zero-sum game—a key component in the realist policy 
prescriptions discussed later in this chapter.  
The balancing effect of rising powers against a hegemon, as mentioned by Layne, 
is widely accepted amongst realists as a natural result of the anarchic international 
order.11 Proponents of the balancing theory argue that the international system favors a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 
17:4 (1993). 
8 Ibid. 12. 
9 Layne uses Kenneth Waltz’s criteria to define great powers as those that rank highly compared to their 
peers in: “size of population and territory; resource endowment; military strength; political stability; and 
competence.” Ibid. 8, as quoted from Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Relations,” (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979): 131. Layne uses the term “eligible states” to refer to states that have the potential 
to become great powers that could challenge unipolarity. In his 1993 work he focuses primarily on 
Germany and Japan, however, in Layne, China’s Challenge to US Hegemony, the same arguments are 
applied with respect to China. 
10 Layne, The Unipolar Illusion, 11. 
11It is important to note that the idea of states balancing against each other is not the same as the “balance 
of power theory,” which states that the international system is most stable when there is a balance of power. 
See: Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 125-126; Stephen M. Walt, “American Primacy: Its 
Prospects and Pitfalls,” Naval War College Review LV:2 (2002): 19. While the balance of power theory 
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more even distribution of power since states find it in their best interest to limit the power 
of others, thereby increasing their own relative strength and security. In his formative 
work Man, the State, and War (1959), neorealist Kenneth Waltz makes the case that the 
balance of power “is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by 
events on statesmen.”12 Waltz likens the practice of power politics to a game that states 
may take up with varying intensity and in combination with a mix of other “games” or 
national interests they choose to pursue, but a game that ultimately must be played if a 
state wishes to survive. Along this line of inevitability Stephen Walt maintains that even 
friendly states can never truly trust one another and therefore “this tendency (balancing) 
will be muted if the strongest state acts in a benevolent fashion and its goals are broadly 
compatible with the interests of other major powers, but it never vanishes entirely.”13 The 
conclusion being that under the realist view of power politics China’s rise is an inherent 
structural challenge to US hegemony regardless of China’s true intentions or the United 
States’ genuine desire to welcome a growing China. 
John Mearsheimer takes the standard power balancing theory one step farther 
with his theory of offensive realism. Unlike Waltz, who claims states “at a minimum, 
seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination,”14 
Mearsheimer argues that structural forces encourage states only to maximize their power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
requires the mechanism of balancing, not all realist then reach the conclusion that the international system 
is most stable when power is balanced. See: John Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” 
(New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001): 34; Layne, The Unipolar Illusion, 12. This is most 
clearly demonstrated in hegemonic stability theory, see: Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, 
“Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” Review of International Studies 15:2 (1989).  
12 Kenneth Waltz, “Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,” (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), Kindle Edition: location 3884. 
13 Walt, American Primacy, 19. 
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118. 
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with the ultimate goal of dominating the system.15 Mearsheimer’s characteristically 
pessimistic view claims that in order to increase their security states are necessarily 
offensive and aggressive in their pursuit of power. States, according to offensive realism, 
are “power maximizers” due to their rational fear that other states are likely to pursue the 
same strategy.16 This self-fulfilling prophecy is part of what Mearsheimer calls the 
“tragedy” of great power politics. Such an argument would certainly reject China’s 
mantra of a “peaceful rise” as no more than a ruse. Indeed, this is a common argument of 
both Mearsheimer and Layne evident in the former’s article, China’s Unpeaceful Rise 
(2006), and Layne’s accusation that “Beijing is pursuing a peaceful policy today in order 
to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow.”17 
Offensive realism not only makes claims as to why states like China will rise to 
challenge the United States, but also predicts how the US is likely to respond to such a 
challenge. Mearsheimer argues that the US derives its unipolar status not from being a 
global hegemon—“which dominate the whole world”—but instead by being the sole 
regional hegemon on the map (defined instead as dominating a specific region with no 
local competitors).18 Mearsheimer’s argument is that while true global hegemony is 
nearly impossible to achieve due to the vastness of the world’s oceans and the difficulty 
of projecting power across the globe, states that become regional hegemons—whereby 
they are not threatened by any other great power in their immediate neighborhood—are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 While Waltz and other defensive realist believe that states can pursue security without striving for total 
dominance, and therefore allow for the interplay of other factors, offensive realism argues that the states 
can only ever feel satisfied with security when they have no peer competitors. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics, 29-54. 
16 Ibid, 32. 
17 John Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105:690 (2006); Layne, China’s 
Challenge to US Hegemony, 14. 
18 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 41; John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: 
China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 381-396. 
9	  	  
granted the “freedom to roam” and spread their influence and power without being 
preoccupied with defending the homeland.19 The security of a regional hegemon is 
threatened both by the rise of a great power within its region and the achievement of 
regional hegemony by a great power elsewhere on the globe.  Even if said hegemon is 
across a vast ocean, if it gains its own freedom to roam then the two regional hegemons 
are destined to confront one another. Under offensive realism regional hegemons are 
therefore motivated by fear and uncertainty to interfere with and prevent the rise of peer 
competitors. Mearsheimer points to the policies of Manifest Destiny and the Monroe 
Doctrine as examples in America’s history of its efforts to become a regional hegemon 
and its involvement in the two World Wars and later the Cold War as a clear indication of 
America’s intolerance of other regional hegemons.20 He then concludes that the United 
States will continue its tendency to act aggressively to prevent the ascendancy of other 
regional hegemon and in this regard “is likely to behave towards China much the way it 
behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”21 
While Mearsheimer’s depictions of the international system could in some ways 
be interpreted as the most “pure” extension of realist principles, offensive realism is far 
from universally accepted by realist scholars.22 Its natural companion theory—defensive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The “freedom to roam” concept is explained in John Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” The National 
Interest 129 (2014): 12-13; and Jonathan Levine, “The Coming Asian Rebalancing,” The National Interest, 
September 25, 2012, accessed January 5, 2014:  (http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-coming-asian-
rebalancing-7513?page=1). 
20 Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful Rise, 161. 
21 Ibid. 161. 
22 It could be argued that offensive realism is the most literal and maximally applied interpretation of the 
propositions of anarchy, egoism, and power politics. For a discussion of the inter-realist debate see: Jeffery 
W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 
25:3 (2000): 128-161; Christopher Layne, “A House of Cards: American Strategy toward China,” World 
Policy Journal 14:3 (1997): 78-79; Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many 
Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 37; and Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for 
U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21:3 (1997): 5-53. 
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realism—relies on the same basic assumption about states and the international system 
yet arrives at a different view of the forces such a system creates. Jeffery Taliaferro 
presents the differences between offensive and defensive realism as essentially being one 
of focus. While offensive realism argues that anarchy and uncertainty dictate that states 
can only truly maximize security by maximizing their power, defensive realism opens the 
field for a broader range of variables and considerations (in some cases going as far as 
domestic factors) that affect how a state may pursue security.23 Taliaferro explains that 
defensive realists point to a number of “structural modifiers” including “offense-defense 
balance, geographic proximity, access to raw materials, international economic pressure, 
regional or didactic military balances, and the ease with which states can extract 
resources from the conquered territory.”24 While defensive realists agree with offensive 
realists that states are motivated by a self-help pursuit of security, they argue that the 
consideration of such modifiers incentivizes strategies other than pure power 
maximization. Layne provides a comparison of offensive and defensive realist policy 
prescriptions with respect to China and states that while the two approaches “define US 
interests identically and agree broadly about the threats to them” and “concur that 
continued American ‘hegemony’ is desirable,”25 they disagree about how best to react to 
China’s rise.26  
  
The differences in the descriptive theoretical approaches among realists have 
resulted in multiple realist formulations of US strategy towards a rising China. Of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Taliaferro, Security Seeking Under Anarchy, 128-161. 
24 Ibid. 137.  
25 Layne, A House of Cards, 78-79. 
26 Ibid. 88-89. 
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four grand strategies Barry Posen and Andrew Ross (1997) identify as the competing 
arguments for the United States’ post-Cold War role in the world, three are backed by 
realist ideology.27 These include neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and primacy28 
and can be roughly placed along a spectrum from defensive to offensive realism.29  As 
with the different branches of theoretical realism, uniting all three of these grand 
strategies is the base assumption that relative power is the guiding force of state behavior 
and therefore international security is a zero-sum game. As a result, each realist grand 
strategy begins by acknowledging the inherent threat that a rising China presents to the 
United States and attempts to answer the question of how best to mitigate this issue. 
Where they differ in theoretical nuances, however, leads to starkly contrasted policy 
recommendations. In the discussion of realist grand strategies below, neo-isolationism 
has been replaced by the more widely discussed and supported strategy of offshore 
balancing.30 This is not to imply that the two are interchangeable—though supporters of 
offshore balancing often find themselves defending against such claims—but rather that 
offshore balancing offers a more current and realistic formulation of the opinions that 
support significant scaling back of US security involvement abroad. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Posen and Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, 3. 
28 In this paper the term primacy is used interchangeably with preponderance. 
29 This spectrum—with neo-isolationism on one side, primacy on the other, and selective engagement 
somewhere in the middle—mirrors the range from strict defensive realism to strict offensive realism. 
However, as discussed later in this chapter, arguments can be made from both theoretical backgrounds in 
support of each strategy. 
30 Even in Posen and Ross’ 1997 article they admit that neo-isolationism is “probably the least popular 
grand strategy” with its own supporters often shunning the word “isolationism” in favor of more palatable 
euphemisms. Posen and Ross, Competing  Grand Strategy, 7. Offshore balancing on the other has gained 
considerable attention in the past decade, particularly following the protracted wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Stephen M. Walt, “Offshore Balancing: an idea whose time has come,” Foreign Policy, 
November 2, 2011, accessed February 14, 2014: 
(http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore_balancing_an_idea_whose_time_has_come); 
Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” The National Interest, January 27, 
2012, accessed February 14, 2014: (http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-
balancing-6405).  
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The term “offshore balancing” provides both a literal description of the strategy 
itself and reveals its realist roots in balance of power politics. The basic idea is that a 
hegemonic state can safely and cost-effectively preserve its uncontested preeminence by 
allowing other great powers to compete with each other rather than attempting to 
dominate all other states with a preponderance of power.31 The goal is to lower the cost 
of preventing a peer competitor while decreasing the likelihood of becoming entangled in 
a great power war. By cutting foreign security commitments, closing bases, and bringing 
deployed ground forces home, the United States would rely on the offshore capabilities of 
naval and air forces to affect the balance of power only when absolutely necessary. 
Supporters argue that offshore balancing is therefore particularly suitable for the US 
given its unique dominance in air and sea power and its naturally defensive geography.32 
Without the broad and numerous security commitments the United States currently 
undertakes with its policies of extended deterrence and international stewardship, the US 
would be less likely to become involved in a war it doesn’t want to fight. In his 
introduction to offshore balancing, Van Ness quotes American politician Patrick 
Buchanan promoting this aspect of the strategy: “It is time we began uprooting the global 
network of ‘trip wires’ planted on foreign soil to ensnare the United States in the wars of 
other nations.”33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For descriptions of offshore balancing see: Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore 
Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22:1 (1997): 87-88; Peter Van Ness, 
“Alternative U.S. Strategies with respect to China and the Implications for Vietnam,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 20:2 (1998): 160-161; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 10; and 
Stephen M. Walt, “Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy,” (New York, NY: W. 
W. Norton, 2005): chap. 5.  
32 Mearsheimer, America Unhinged, 11. 
33 Patrick Buchanan, “America First—and Second, and Third,” The National Interest 19 (1990): 77-82, as 
quoted in Van Ness, Alternative U.S. Strategies, 155. 
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Offshore balancing as applied to Asia would entail a drastic shift in US force 
posture and regional relationships. In order to eliminate the “trip wires” Buchanan alludes 
to, the US would withdraw from its current security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the 
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and back away from its ambiguous commitment 
to protect Taiwan. US bases in these countries would be closed and the more active 
defense cooperation with counties such as Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia would be 
significantly scaled back—if not terminated completely. By retracting its efforts to 
prevent the rise of a regional hegemon, the US would rely on the inter-balancing between 
the UK, France, Germany and Russia in Europe and China, Japan, Russia, India, and 
South Korea in Asia. In the Asian theater Japan would be the most formidable new power 
as it realizes its latent military strength held at bay since the end of World War Two.34 
While the idea of a remilitarized Japan may seem to only add more fuel to fire, Layne 
argues that this is precisely what offshore balancing aims to achieve: 
 
“China’s rise as a great power (combined with increasing doubts about the 
viability of US security guarantees) will provide a power incentive for Japan to become a 
strategically self-sufficient great power. Rather than fearing Japan’s great power 
reemergence, the United States should exploit it. Rather than attempting to contain both 
China and Japan simultaneously, the optimal American strategy would be to allow China 
and Japan to contain each other, while the United States watches from a safe distance.” 
 
 
Offshore balancing has received support from both offensive and defensive 
realists.35 For defensive realists the strategy neatly fits into their picture of how the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Layne, A House of Cards, 93. 
35 For offensive realists see: John Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs 
80:5 (2001). For defensive realists see: Walt, Taming American Power, chap. 5. 
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international system works by default.36 Since states seek mainly to maximize their 
security rather than power, the United States should naturally scale back its foreign 
military posture that is the byproduct of the post-War and Cold War eras.37 For defensive 
realists the strategy of offshore balancing is in line with the forces the international 
system places on states. However, as a staunch offensive realist, Mearsheimer presents 
offshore balancing as a strategy to resist—rather than fall in line with—the systemic 
forces of the international system. Although according to Mearsheimer US attempts to 
contain China are the result of its rational drive to remain the sole regional hegemon, he 
encourages American leaders to avoid what he calls the tragedy of great power politics 
that inevitably leads to conflict.38 Following the logic of offensive realism one might 
assume that the United States should remain in Asia and conduct full-scale containment 
of China to prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon—as indeed Mearsheimer 
predicts the US is likely to do.39 However, Mearsheimer does not condone this strategy 
and calculates that regardless off Chinas ability to continue to rise and pursue regional 
hegemony, the United States would be better served by removing itself from harm’s way. 
He argues that America as an offshore balancer would be able to achieve its goal of 
preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon by allowing Japan and Russia to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is most likely why in Posen and Ross, Competing  Grand Strategy, the authors place offshore 
balancing on the defensive spectrum of realism since it matches both descriptive and normative judgments 
of state behavior.   
37 Layne, The Unipolar Illusion, 33-35. 
38 Mearsheimer admits his depiction of the likely outcome of the rise of China is “categorically 
depressing.” Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful Rise, 162.   
39 Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful Rise, 161. 
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attempt to contain China and only getting involved if competition in the region leads to a 
war China is likely to win. 40  
 
If offshore balancing can be seen as a step away from isolationism on the scale of 
involvement in international security strategy, selective engagement is a few steps 
farther. Both strategies share in their narrow definition of US vital interests and suggest a 
focusing on the balance of great powers.41 As is implied by the name, however, selective 
engagement presents a much more active strategy that closer resembles that of 
preponderance.  The strategy of selective engagement is not one that deals with how the 
US should interact with a particular state or potential adversary, but rather the general 
level of security commitment the US maintains with the rest of the world. One scholar 
goes so far as to remark that “the only diﬀerence between selective engagement and 
hegemonic dominion lies in the degree of US military engagement.”42 Although perhaps 
an oversimplification, this statement points to a shared assumption between selective 
engagement and preponderance that set these two strategies apart from offshore 
balancing. This assumption is that global leadership and engagement—and not merely 
unipolar status—is a vital interest of the United States and brings greater benefits than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mearsheimer presents a two-variable matrix with US military commitments to Asia on one axis 
(sustained or withdrawn) and China’s growth on the other (sustained or slowed/reversed). If the US 
remains in Asia and China’s growth slows, it may be able to prevent conflict but only at the high cost of the 
preponderance strategy. However, if China’s growth does not slow, engagement would pull the US into a 
great power war with a China that could conceivable win—dealing the greatest blow to American security. 
If the US withdraws from Asia and China’s growth slows, Mearsheimer suggests Japan and Russia will be 
able to balance against China’s power. If the US leaves and China continues to grow there will likely be a 
great power war, although this time the US will be able to join late as it did in the World Wars and “win the 
peace and shape the postwar world to its advantage.” Mearsheimer, The Future of the American Pacifier, 
55-60. 
41 Posen and Ross, Competing  Grand Strategy, 15-19. 
42 Kai He, “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the 
Cold War,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 1124. 
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costs.43 Bryan McGrath and Ryan Evans make this point in their arguments of the 
necessity of US global engagement: “The world needs the United States. […] It would be 
nice if the world did not require American power to underwrite freedom of the commons 
and the relative global stability painstakingly and deliberately built and maintained since 
the end of World War II. But that is not the world we live in.”44 With this sentiment, 
supporters of selective engagement present a strategy in Asia that largely utilizes the 
traditional alliance relationships to maintain stability and balance against a rising China.45 
Returning to the name “selective engagement,” the next distinguishing component 
of the strategy after engagement itself is of course selectivity. Proponents of selective 
engagement argue that while yes, “The world needs the United States,” the United States 
does not need the entire world. Broadly speaking, East Asia is universally considered as 
one of the regions that demands the attention of a selective engagement strategy—in 
addition to Europe and the Persian Gulf.46 However, to what extent the US should be 
committed to selective engagement in the region is a matter of debate among those that 
support the strategy.  
Consistent with most selective engagement supporters, Robert J. Art argues that 
the US commitments to Japan and South Korea are vital pillars in America’s effort to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Robert J. Art lists five potential costs of a less engaged US strategy: nuclear proliferation, substantial 
decline in economic cooperation, a great power war in Europe or Asia that would accelerate the first two 
concerns (this is in opposition to Mearsheimer—who argues that great power war on one of these two 
continents would not necessarily be bad for the US, see Mearsheimer, The Future of the American Pacifier, 
58-59), control of Persian Gulf oil by a single actor that could restrict access, and “conquest or destruction 
of either Israel or South Korea, which could fatally weaken other states’ belief in the reliability of the 
United States.” Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” 
International Security 15:4 (1991): 50. See also: Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of 
Selective Engagement,” International Security 23:3 (1998): 82. 
44 Bryan McGrath and Ryan Evans, “American Strategy and Offshore Balancing by Default,” War on the 
Rocks, August 27, 2013, accessed December 21, 2013: (http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/the-balance-is-
not-in-our-favor-american-strategy-and-offshore-balancing-by-default/). 
45 Posen and Ross, Competing  Grand Strategy, 18 
46 Ibid., 18.  
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prevent instability and nuclear proliferation.47 Art disagrees, however, with fellow 
selective engagement supporter, Charles Glaser, over the sensitive issue of Taiwan. 
Glaser does not see Taiwan as falling under the limited interests of selective engagement 
and suggests that continued support of the island is not worth the potential to pull the US 
into a conflict with China.48 Art argues that the US cannot consider distancing itself from 
Taiwan because of the effect it would have on other American commitments in the 
region: “If the United States reneged on this commitment and allowed the mainland to 
reintegrate Taiwan forcibly into China, then America’s commitment to Japan, as well as 
its reliability in the eyes of its other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm.”49 
The concern Art expresses stems both from the traditional fear that appeasement will 
only encourage an aggressor (China) and that Japan and Korea may pursue their own 
nuclear forces if they perceive American extended deterrence to be unreliable. Glaser 
dismisses these claims and points out that “not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they 
are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool.”50 He also argues that the US 
could easily reassure its more stable allies with a “renewed declaration” of its 
commitments or other actions to show that it still supports the status quo.51  
This particular disagreement is characteristic of the ambiguity of selective 
engagement. Under the pretext that East Asia is a vital region for American foreign 
policy interests and that limited yet purposeful security engagement is required to 
maintain a favorable balance of power, the strategy of selective engagement leaves much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Art, Geopolitics Updated, 81.  
48 Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign 
Affairs 90 (2011). 
49 Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political 
Science Quarterly 125:3 (2010): 375. 
50 Glaser, Will China’s Rise Lead to War? 
51 Ibid. 
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to be determined when it comes to how exactly the US should react to a rising China. As 
Posen and Ross point out, selective engagement “lacks a certain romance” and is 
relatively light on the “idealism or commitment to principle” found in other grand 
strategies.52 Although selective engagement inherently allows for this flexibility in 
deciding exactly what to select and how to engage, the underlying goal of balancing 
against and ultimately containing the rise of China remains. 
 
The final realist strategy in response to China’s rise to be discussed here is the 
strategy of preponderance. Preponderance (also referred to as primacy) can be described 
as a strategy that attempts to promote an imbalance of power in the international system 
that is large enough to make any effort to balance against it infeasible.53 The strategy 
utilizes the Cold War era policies of extended deterrence and containment to dissuade 
potential powers (both friendly and hostile, respectively) from challenging US 
hegemony.54  As Layne summarizes: “The key elements of this strategy are creation and 
maintenance of U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and 
economic power, and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the 
international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Posen and Ross, Competing  Grand Strategy, 20. 
53 Ibid. 31. 
54 The leaked draft of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance provides a clear example of this strategy. See: 
“Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival’,” The New York Times, 
March 8, 1992, accessed March 24, 2014: (http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-
pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1). 
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East Asia.”55 Essentially, the strategy of preponderance is to maintain as closely as 
possible the position the United States enjoyed at the end of the Cold War.56 
Samuel P. Huntington considers the very questioning of the strategy of 
preponderance to be nonsensical. As he states: “To ask whether primacy matters is to ask 
whether power matters. And the answer can only be: of course.”57 Huntington uses 
textbook-offensive realism to argue that, given the chance, states will adopt a power 
maximizing strategy that will eventually threaten the US.58 This pressure in turn requires 
the United States to maximize its own power through the strategy of preponderance, 
which, Huntington states, “is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the 
future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.”59 It 
is clear from Huntington’s words that the strategy of preponderance does not suffer from 
the lack of idealism and romance that collective engagement does. However, emphasis 
should not be placed on the ideological aspects of the preponderance strategy because 
although those who argue that US primacy is necessary and beneficial often speak of 
what they see as universal American ideals, Huntington himself begins with the 
admission that preponderance is first and foremost concerned with power. From the 
realist perspective this power is strictly relative.60 This is the key component that 
separates preponderance from liberal policies that similarly promote intensive American 
engagement abroad. A policy of preponderance in response to China’s rise would see not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Layne, From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, 88. 
56 Walt, American Primacy, 9; Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or 
Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?,” World Policy Journal 15:2 (1998): 10. 
57 Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17:4 (1993): 68. 
58 Writing in 1993, Huntington spoke primarily of the threat of growing Japanese power. Ibid. 72. 
59 Ibid. 83. 
60 Huntington states: “With respect to power, however, absolute gains are meaningless.” Ibid. 69. 
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just continued US commitments to East Asia, but commitments designed specifically to 
combat the realization of a peer competitor. 
 In 1992 a draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for the fiscal 
years of 1994-1999 was leaked to the New York Times.61 The document—the first of its 
kind since the end of the Cold War—demonstrated a clear formulation of preponderance 
the US grand strategy. The “first objective” of this strategy was to “prevent the re-
emergence of a new rival” through a system of deterrence and US power that persuaded 
both allies and adversaries “not to aspire to a greater role.”62 Supporting strong 
unilateralism, the leaked DPG portrayed multilateral security cooperation as merely an 
“ad hoc” tool, with stability among nations “ultimately backed by the US.”63 These two 
positions provide a framework from which a strategy of preponderance towards a rising 
China could be built.  
It is clear that US preponderance in East Asia would entail clear actions to 
demonstrate to China that seeking a greater role in the region would be considered by the 
US as a direct threat and challenge. Given that China falls outside the US “sphere of 
influence” that envelops other potential great power competitors such as Germany and 
Japan, the task of keeping China in check with a strategy of preponderance would require 
overt policies of containment.64 As mentioned earlier, offensive realists such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 “Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival’,” The New York Times, 
March 8, 1992, accessed March 14, 2014: (http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-
pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html). 
62 Ibid. 
63 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop,” The New York Times, March 
8, 1992, accessed March 14, 2014: (http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-
insuring-no-rivals-develop.html). 
64 Indeed Layne points out that some within the US strategic community support acts of sabotage against 
China’s political and economic system and even preventative war. Layne, Rethinking American Grand 
Strategy, 10. 
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Mearsheimer predict that this is exactly what will happen, with a new Cold War 
developing between the US and China.65 As for US commitments in the region, the 
traditional security partnerships with Japan and South Korea would be maintained both to 
place US forces within close proximity to China and to ensure that those states—and 
Japan in particular—do not feel the need to building their own balancing power. Other 
bilateral relationships could also be used to pull potential partners away from China and 
deepen its isolation. Finally, multilateralism may be promoted by the US sporadically, in 
limited instances in which cost sharing is preferred over freedom of US action.  
 
The discussion above details some of the theoretical and strategic arguments of 
realists concerned with how the United States will, or should, react to growing Chinese 
power. Although variations among the different viewpoints on the nature of the 
international system result in a full range of policy recommendations as to the optimal 
level of US engagement in East Asia, each of the three strategies discussed and their 
theoretical underpinnings share in the basic realist assumption that international politics 
is a zero-sum game of narrow self-interest and relative power. With this understanding, 
the rise of China is inherently seen as a threat to US security that can only be mitigated 
by maintaining superior relative power. This is, however, not the only interpretation 
discussed by scholars and strategists. In the following section the liberal approach to the 
rise of China will be introduced. This approach rejects the basic realist assumptions and 
in so doing presents both a new challenge relating to China’s rise and new answers. 
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 Andrew Moravcsik writes: “the central insight shared by all Liberals is 
that states are embedded in domestic and international civil society, which decisively 
constrains their actions.”66 This insight is essentially a rejection of the realist portrayal of 
states as homogenous, unitary decision makers with limited interests of security and 
power. Liberal international relations theory proposes what might be considered a more 
nuanced alternative, which deconstructs the “black box” of the state. For Liberals, states 
themselves are an amalgamation of private individuals and groups that seek a range of 
independent interests through political means.67 The process of globalization—described 
as “opportunities and incentives to engage in transnational economic, social, and cultural 
activity”—creates overlap between the interests of these domestic groups.68 It is therefore 
what Moravcsik describes as “policy interdependence,” or the interaction between these 
domestically derived state interests, that creates the social pressures of the international 
civil society that drive state behavior.  
 The implications of the liberal paradigm are far-reaching. Opening up the 
internal workings of the state and expanding state interests beyond just power and 
security has resulted in subfields of liberalism that focus on domestic political stricture, 
international organizations, and economics. Some of the defining theories to emerge from 
these subfields include democratic peace theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and 
economic interdependence theory.69 All three of these theories rest on a central 	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Working Paper Series 92-6 (1992), abstract. 
67 Ibid. 6-7. 
68 Andrew Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism” in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, ed. 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), Kindle Edition: 235. 
69 Kant explored the foundations of democratic peace theory in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace.  For 
modern discussions of the theory see: Melvin Small and David J. Singer, “The War Proneness of 
Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1:4 (1976); Bruce Bueno 
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conclusion of liberalism: the multidimensionality of state interests allows for positive-
sum cooperation in the international system. This section will introduce this tenet and the 
resulting liberal strategy of cooperative security as well as how this strategy would be 
utilized in reaction to China’s rise. 
 
 The liberal proposition that the international system allows for positive-
sum cooperation largely rests on the distinction between absolute and relative gains.70 
Unlike the realist view of international politics, which presents states as being concerned 
only with their relative power compared to other states, liberals argue that states are 
primarily concerned with absolute gains to their wealth and power. The significance of 
this distinction lies in understanding how it affects the ability of states to cooperate.  
 The introduction of neoliberal institutionalism in the 1980s saw a focus on 
relative gains as the primary object of states’ interests. In his book After Hegemony 
(1984) that arguably sparked much of the modern debate between realists and liberals, 
Robert Keohane uses economic theory to discuss the behavior of states (or “firms”) in an 
anarchic system. Within this model states are assumed to be “rational egoists” and “profit 
maxmizers.”  Keohane explains that “egoism means that their utility functions are 
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Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security 19:2 (1994). For neoliberal institutionalism 
see: Robert Keohane, “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy,” (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), Kindle Edition; John Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an 
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independent from one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains 
and losses of others.”71 States as rational egoists would make choices that maximize their 
gains, regardless of the gains received by other states. The assertion here is that the 
maxims of economic theory extend equally into the realm national power.  Keohane 
supports this claim by arguing that economic wealth and power are two sides of the same 
coin in international relations. He writes: “attempts to separate a sphere of real activity, 
called ‘economics,’ from another sphere of real activity, called ‘politics,’ are doomed to 
frustration and failure. […] In the real world of international relations, most significant 
issues are simultaneously political and economic.”72 Keohane’s depiction of states as 
rational egoists, and therefore concerned with absolute gains, has become a dominant 
position of neoliberal institutionalists and liberals at large. 73  
 To show how rational egoist states in a system of anarchy could achieve 
cooperative behavior, Robert Axelrod first utilized an “iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” 
model in 1980.74 The traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma shows cooperation to be an 
irrational choice in a situation where cheating can bring potentially greater gains while 
disproportionally harming the other participant. Even though both states can gain more 
from mutual cooperation than mutual cheating, because neither state can be certain that 
they other will not cheat and thereby take all the gains, both will decide to cheat. 
However, Axelrod argues that if this dilemma is conducted repeatedly between the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Keohane, After Hegemony, location 587. 
72 Ibid. location 471. 
73 Halas, Post Scriptum on Relative and Absolute Gains, 28-31. 
74 Robert Axelrod, “Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:1 
(1980). 
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two participants, cooperation becomes the unilateral rational choice.75 To demonstrate 
this, Axelrod conducted the Computer Tournament for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
which 16 different computer programs competed against themselves, one another, and a 
program that randomly chose between cooperation and cheating. The winning program, 
decided by the total number of points at the end of the tournament, was also the 
simplest.76 This program was designed to cooperate initially and then mimic its 
opponent’s previous move—rewarding cooperation with the same, and punishing 
cheating with retaliation. Liberal theorists interpreted the implications of this result as 
evidence that rational egoist states in an anarchic system could achieve mutually 
beneficial cooperation.77 
Realists have strongly criticized that the analysis provided by Axelrod and other 
liberals fails to recognize state preferences for relative, rather than absolute gains.78 In 
response, Robert Powel argues that the behavior realists attempt to explain with relative 
gains preferences can in fact be more accurately modeled with absolute gains.79 Powel 
recognizes that the traditional iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not capture the 
motivation behind realists’ focus on relative gains—namely that in an anarchic system 
there is always the possibility that states may resort to war to achieve their aims and, 
most importantly, that such actions can change the structure of the relationships between 
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76 Ibid. 7. 
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Security Affairs,” World Politics 37:1 (1984), 6. 
78 Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organizations 42:3 (1988). For an overview of the “neo-neo debate” see: 
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states.80 Powel uses an ingenious yet simple solution to address this concern in his 
dynamic model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. After each iteration of his game, Powel 
includes the option for either state to attack the other in an act of war. Waging, winning, 
or loosing one of these wars carries its own point value and the relative points of the two 
states involved decide the result of a war.81 The option of war sensitizes states to the 
relative gains of the game since unequal gains in favor of their opponent will eventually 
incentivize the other player to wage a war they are likely to win. Using this model, Powel 
finds that with a low cost to war, cooperation becomes even more difficult than 
represented in standard models. However, as the cost of war increases, the potential harm 
of a defecting opponent is once again balanced out by the benefits of cooperation.82 
Powel argues quite convincingly that this altered game presents a more accurate 
replication of the systemic constraints placed on states and therefore a better model of 
state behavior.  
Rather than debate the premise of realist claims of the significance of relative 
gains, Duncan Snidal argues that even if states prefer relative gains, other factors such as 
the payoff distribution of the potential gains from cooperation and competition can 
mitigate the effect that relative gains preference has on cooperation.83 Snidal also uses 
game theory to demonstrate that “relative gains considerations are shown to matter only 
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for issues involving small numbers of states. The impact of relative gains drops off 
quickly with more than two states and is virtually irrelevant for issues involving a larger 
number of actors.”84 With these two points Snidal argues that even if the realist premise 
of state preference for relative gains is granted, mutually beneficial cooperation is 
achievable among states in an anarchic system. 
Regardless of how liberal theorists arrive at their conclusions, the central position 
supported by the arguments above is that in an anarchic international system of self-
interested states, substantial cooperation can be achieved. The implications of this claim 
are primarily relevant in a normative, rather than descriptive manner. Robert Jervis 
summarized the differences between realism and liberalism in this regard:  
 
 
“Neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather, 
neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than 
does realism, and the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world 
politics is unnecessary or avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree even though 
their preferences overlap.”85 
 
 
The concepts of unrealized cooperation and avoidable conflict are clearly of vital 
relevance to a US strategy towards China. Unlike the three realist strategies discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the liberal theoretical framework allows for a strategy that seeks a 
cooperative, rather than combative relationship between the US and a rising China. It is 
important not to infer from this that liberals promote a sort of idealism in which peace 
and stability are the results of a natural progression in international relations. Rather, as 
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Jarvis points out, the liberal approach merely suggests that such an outcome is potentially 
attainable and that great powers are not necessarily doomed to a cycle of conflict and 
war. The final strategy to be introduced in this chapter embodies this understanding, and 
is designed to work towards realizing a sustainable, peaceful relationship between two 
global powers through the shaping of incentives and interests in the global civil society. 
 
The strategy of cooperative security is intended to prevent, rather than win, a 
competition for power. As Peter Van Ness elaborates: “The logic of cooperative security 
is mutual benefit (that is, enhanced security) for all parties. […] There is no enemy in the 
cooperative security design. Instead, ‘the enemy’ is strategic instability.”86 Strongly 
dependent on the liberal understanding of the international system in which mutual 
benefit in security matters is indeed possible, cooperative security stands noticeably apart 
from the three strategies discussed so far. As a US strategy in East Asia, cooperative 
security would be aimed at building a security community in the region that would 
incentivize China’s involvement through the promise of stability, rather than the threat of 
containment. 
Interdependence is both a cause and effect of cooperative security. Supporters of 
the strategy argue that globalization, and the increased “strategic interdependence” of 
states due to the ease with which security issues proliferate across borders, necessitates a 
broadening of US security interests.87 The resulting conclusion is that peace is 
“effectively indivisible.”88 Conflict that erupts between any two states, or even within a 	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single state, is likely to have negative spillover effects throughout the region, which could 
lead to broader conflict. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the US to be actively 
engaged in stability measures. This sense of interdependence drives the logic behind the 
mutual benefit of cooperative security. As a sort of self-perpetuating mechanism, 
cooperative security also inherently strengthens the interdependence that initially 
motivates states to adopt the strategy. 
Although the theoretical underpinnings and strategic goals of cooperative security 
differ greatly from realist strategies, there are several ways in which they may appear 
similar in implementation. Both cooperative security and the strategy of preponderance 
call for expanded US engagement in Asia and support the use of force in a less 
constricted manner than offshore balancing or selective engagement.89 Offshore 
balancing stands alone in its call for abandoning the current major US alliances in the 
region, while cooperative security and the other two realist strategies all support their 
continuation. Where cooperative security begins to functionally separate from the realist 
engagement strategies is in the proposed structure of US engagements in Asia and the 
inclusion of China as a partner rather than an opponent.  
A necessary component of the interdependence that provides the foundation for 
cooperative security is of course multilateralism.90 In order for states to be dependent on 
one another they must be linked through a robust network of interactions. This reasoning 
is in line with Snidal’s findings on the positive effects that increasing the number of 
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actors has on the feasibility of cooperation. Cooperative security in Asia therefore not 
only calls for an expansion of US engagements beyond its traditional alliances, but also 
that such an expansion be structured in a multilateral environment wherever possible. 
This multilateralism is fostered through international institutions that propagate common 
norms, increase communication and information flows, and provide a structured forum 
for addressing disputes.91 
Richard Cohen explains that while traditional military alliance structures have 
been based on the concept of collective defense, which “looks outward to defend its 
members from external aggression,” cooperative security “looks inward to attempt to 
ensure security within a group of sovereign states.”92 This reflects Van Ness’ 
characterization of the strategy as being without an enemy. The utility of such an 
approach is clearly dependent on potential sources of instability being subsumed within 
the framework of cooperative security. Taking this into account for a US strategy in East 
Asia, cooperative security would be doomed to failure without the inclusion of China. 
This distinction sets cooperative security significantly apart from the realist strategies, 
including the realist engagement strategy of preponderance. Under cooperative security, 
the United States would have to make the strategic gamble to forgo efforts to forestall or 
contain China’s rise, and instead focus on influencing the perceptions and interests of 
China.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Cohen and Mihalka discuss the importance of institutions in cooperative security, focusing mainly on 
NATO and the EU. Ibid. 18-21. 
92 Cohen gives this description to “collective security,” which is only part of his concept of cooperative 
security. Ibid. 6. 
31	  	  
The purpose of this chapter was to lay down the theoretical underpinnings and 
strategic frameworks of the most widely debated US responses to a rising China. Each 
response is informed not only by the interests and objects that it seeks to fulfill but also 
by the underlying assumptions it makes on the behavior of states and the nature of the 
international system. Realism—with its focus on the distribution of relative power—
engenders strategies that are primarily concerned with preserving the United States’ 
privileged spot as sole global superpower. The realist paradigm views China’s rise as part 
of the natural competition for power that all states engage in out of a concern for security 
and mistrust of their peers. From this perspective, China’s increasing strength presents a 
fundamental challenge to US security, which requires direct opposition. Variations in 
realist theories have resulted in three primary strategies, which differ most notably in the 
level of engagement they deem necessary to confront this issue. However, all three of the 
realist strategies contrast sharply with the single approach that is supported by the liberal 
theoretical background. The liberal school of thought suggests a more flexible 
understanding of state preferences and the international system. As a result, the liberal 
strategy of cooperative security aims at molding the behavior of states by incorporating 
them in to a system of mutually beneficial cooperation based on multilateral 
interdependence. This strategy rejects the claim that the US and China are necessary 
rivals. Instead it rests on the assumption that the proper policies instituted on both sides 
can create a stable and long-lasting peace. 
The remaining sections of this paper will argue that the United States has chosen 
to respond to the rise of China with the strategy of cooperative security. The opinions and 
actions of US government and military officials demonstrate the intention to incorporate 
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China into a US-lead system of regional partners, rather than use such a system to contain 
Chinese power. A key factor in such a strategy is clear communication and mutual 
understanding of each party’s intent. It is therefore vital to the purpose of cooperative 
security that America’s China strategy be articulated for foreign and domestic audiences.   
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III.  US Strategic Vision 
 
 
The fervent debate on US grand strategy for the post-Cold War world has 
continued to flourish for the past two and a half decades, due in large part to the 
perception that the United States has yet to adapt to changes in the international system 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 93 At the end of the Cold War, with the nearly 
overnight shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, the US was faced with reshaping core 
foreign policy objectives, which for almost half a century were defined by a reality that 
no longer existed. The grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union, and the spread of 
communism, had become obsolete. In the remaining years of the 20th century, American 
leaders failed to establish a coherent new grand strategy that could transcend individual 
issues and persist through successive administrations.94 Following the September 11th 
terrorist attacks in 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush introduced what 
appeared to be a new American grand strategy of reinvigorated preponderance, with an 
emphasis on unilateralism, “coercive democratization,”95 reduced reliance on established 
international institutions, and, most strikingly, the doctrine of preventative war.96 	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However, this new strategy was strongly tied to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
with their festering and eventual US drawdown, critics have once again questioned the 
apparent lack of strategic guidance in US foreign policy. Although these criticisms 
address a broader deficiency in US grand strategy, in recent years they have been 
particularly focused on the US response to a rising China.97 In a 2013 hearing before the 
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 
three of the four panel experts responded to the question of whether they could articulate 
a current US-China strategy with the response that “no such strategy exists.”98 
Understandably, to those that believe the US is charging ahead with no game plan, the 
prospect of an increasingly powerful potential adversary is of greatest concern.  
The observation that the United States has not found a consistent grand strategy to 
replace that of containment does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the US has no 
strategy for dealing with China. One other possibility is that US strategy never actually 
changed after the Cold War; it just no longer had anything to contain. With China’s 
continued growth in the past two decades and the reduction of US preoccupation with its 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this may no longer be the case. Despite insistence by US 
officials that the United States has no intention of containing China, some believe that 
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this is precisely what the US is, or will be, doing.99 This belief is perhaps most widely 
held and influential among the Chinese themselves.100 
Although the US response to China’s rise has been delayed, poorly 
communicated, and at times piecemeal, the interpretations above fail to recognize that the 
United States has decidedly committed to the liberal strategy of cooperative security in 
East Asia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the defining aspects of cooperative 
security that set it apart from offshore balancing, selective engagement, and 
preponderance are wide multilateralism and inclusivity. Together these two factors create 
a mutually beneficial system that facilitates peace among powerful states. The design of 
this system sets it apart from those that are perpetuated by the three realist strategies. 
While selective engagement and preponderance use alliances to contain a rising power, 
and offshore balancing leaves the job up to others, cooperative security attempts to build 
a community of states that can change the perceptions and interests of those within it to 
maintain peace. The evidence of a strategy of cooperative security should therefore be 
found in the vision that the United States holds for its security partnerships and alliance 
structure in East Asia. Ultimately what identifies the strategy the US holds for a rising 
China is the regional system of interstate security relationships it supports. 
This chapter will analyze the changing strategic vision the United States has for 
its alliances and security partnerships in East Asia. The principle sources used are the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The NSS is a 	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document mandated by Congress and prepared by the executive branch as the “highest 
level national strategy document in the United States.”101 It is intended to convey the 
broad national interests of the United States in foreign and defense affairs to members of 
the government, military, American public and foreign nations. As an unclassified 
document, the NSS is as much a piece of public diplomacy as one of strategic guidance. 
For this reason it is particularly useful for understanding the role the US seeks for its 
partnerships with other countries, which make up part of the intended audience. The 
QDR is an analogous document to the NSS, which is prepared by the Department of 
Defense and outlines the national defense strategy. Together these two documents are 
essential for understanding the aim and scope of US security strategy in East Asia. 
 
 Following the end of the Second World War, the United States worked 
diligently to establish a system of strong bilateral relationships with three key allies in the 
region: Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Known as the “hub and 
spoke” system, this alliance structure was designed to spread American influence in its 
effort to contain the Soviet Union while maintaining the maximum level of control over 
its alliance partners.102 Relying solely on bilateral relationships ensured that the United 
States almost always held all the cards in dealing with its partners.  
 The end of the Cold War began a shift in the way the US pursued its 
strategic partnerships in East Asia. In the 1987 NSS, American interests and intentions in 	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East Asia were presented in a format that reflected the established hub and spoke system. 
With no mention of multilateralism or international institution, the section on East Asia 
contained only a series of updates on US bilateral relationships and their importance for 
containing the Soviet threat. 103 By 1995, the same section in the Clinton administration’s 
NSS opened with reference to the president’s concept of a “New Pacific Community,”104 
which was billed as part of the first “regional security dialogue.”105 Although these 
developments demonstrated a changing perspective on US partnership in East Asia, 
interest in multilateralism remained primarily focused on economic issues throughout the 
1990s.  
 The next noticeable development in America’s strategy for its partnerships 
in Asia came after the September 11th terrorist attacks and the ensuing Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). The transnational nature of violent extremism and non-state actors 
demanded an unprecedented level of integrated and cooperative initiatives with both old 
and new partners. Unlike the highly visible and identifiable threat of the Soviet Union, 
international terrorism could not be deterred with stockpiled capabilities. The Bush 
administration responded with an approach that called for a reinvigorating of US security 
partnerships on a global scale.  
In the 2001 QDR—conducted prior to September 11th and published just weeks 
after—the section dedicated to US military alliances and partnerships is a mere two 
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paragraphs. 106 Its opening statement contains the platitudes of U.S. assurance to its allies 
and deterrence to potential enemies. In contrast, the 2006 QDR reflected the dramatic 
new role the US military sought for its partnerships abroad. The four-page section titled 
“Working with International Allies and Partners” opens with a telling statement of this 
new vision: “Long-standing alliance relationships will continue to underpin unified 
efforts to address 21st century security challenges.”107 Emphasis on such “unified efforts” 
in the 2006 QDR and their role in combating “common security challenges” demonstrates 
a deeper push towards promoting collective action among US security partnerships. The 
2006 QDR was shaped by the broad new strategic implications of the 2002 NSS, which 
called for new levels of cooperation: 
 
“The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for 
relations between the United States and other main centers of global power, and opened 
vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with 
leaders in Russia, India, and China, we must develop active agendas of cooperation lest 
these relationships become routine and unproductive.”108 
 
  
 While the GWOT had a noticeable influence on the US strategic vision for 
its security partnerships in East Asia and across the globe, the structure that the Bush 
administration presented through its NSS and QDR publications was only a step towards 
cooperative security. The “coalition of the willing” concept that undergirded this new 
multilateralism could more aptly be described as a form of collective defense. Returning 
to the distinction provided by Richard Cohen in the previous chapter, the purpose of 	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collective defense differs from cooperative security in its goal to “defend members from 
an external aggression,”109 rather than maintain stability among them. Perhaps slightly 
confusing, the external aggression faced by the multilateral efforts of the GWOT 
emanates from transnational non-state actors that are embedded within states’ borders.110 
Despite this technicality, the intention for collective defense rather than cooperative 
security was expressed by President Bush in his address to Congress in the days 
following the September 11th attacks, during which he famously proclaimed: “Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”111 This was clearly not the enemy-less strategy 
of cooperative security. 
 The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 brought a new focus to 
American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. During his first year in office Obama 
embarked on a tour of several Asian countries, during which time he labeled himself as 
“America’s first Pacific President.”112 In 2010 the President’s first NSS stated that the 
administration’s work with allies and partners in Asia was “focused on regional security” 
and offered a future of “integration to all Asian nations.”113 The QDR that same year 
acknowledged that the rise of China and other powers was creating an increasingly 
“diffuse” international system that necessitated greater cooperation with allies and 
partners in order to “sustain peace and stability.”114 The connection between the shifting 
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balance of power in the international system and the need for greater cooperation was the 
beginning of a cooperative security strategy in Asia. 
 In 2011, then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton introduced a new strategic 
concept for the Asia-Pacific that significantly advanced the push towards cooperative 
security in the region.115 Known initially as “the pivot” and later as “the rebalancing,” 
this new effort was both a continuation of the focus placed on the region since the 
beginning of the Obama administration and a departure from the established channels of 
US engagement. From its inception, the Asia rebalancing has been primarily concerned 
with shaping a new structure of US alliances and partnerships. In her initial introduction 
of the strategy, Clinton spoke of expanding America’s engagements beyond its traditional 
security partners to include nations such as “China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries.”116 She 
called upon these countries to “join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based 
regional and global order.”117 Rather than focus on the credibility of the United States to 
protect its allies and deter aggression, or the collective action needed to combat a 
particular threat, the Asia rebalancing was intended to build a new regional architecture 
that promoted stability within the region. 
 In the absence of an updated NSS, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 
(DSG) and the 2014 QDR provide a first look at the rebalancing effort incorporated into 
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official strategic proclamation.118 The DSG was specifically produced in response to 
drastic defense budget cuts in the 2011 Budget Control Act, and provides a brief roadmap 
for building the “Joint Force of 2020.”119 Within its assessment of the global security 
environment, the DSG reiterates the necessity of a US rebalancing to Asia as well as a 
focus on shaping a system of relationships in the region. The cooperative security aspect 
of this system is demonstrated in the expectation that China’s rise can work within, rather 
than against this system. As the DSG states: “Working closely with our network of allies 
and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures 
underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers.”120 
 In its own words, “the 2014 QDR represents an evolution of this 
Administration’s prior defense reviews.”121 In contrast to its previous iteration—
described as “fundamentally a wartime strategy,”—the 2014 QDR looks to the future of 
the role of US military power in a changing global security environment.122 One of the 
five defense priorities identified as part of this effort is the rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific 
region. The report contains a stronger emphasis on the importance of the multilateral 
nature of its rebalancing efforts than previous documents and statements. It gives support 
to the “multilateral security architecture” that is developing in Asia, and promotes the 
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promise of this architecture’s ability “to help manage tensions and prevent conflict.”123 
These statements closely mirror the explanations of cooperative security discussed in the 
previous chapter. In its strategic pivot to Asia, the United States has sought to reach out 
and include a wide range of new partners in a multilateral security community in which 
the “enemy” is tension and conflict among the members. 
 
 An expanded multilateral system in East Asia alone does not constitute a 
strategy of cooperative security with respect to China’s rise. The second aspect of 
cooperative security mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is inclusivity. If the 
multilateral system the US envisions for East Asia is to maintain stability and prevent 
conflict among states in the region, China must be part of this system. Without China’s 
inclusion, the design of this system would look much more like the containment strategy 
of preponderance.  
 Unlike the developing strategic vision for cooperative security, which has 
been formed largely in the past decade, engagement with China has been a fundamental 
principle of US strategy in East Asia since President Nixon first began the process of 
normalizing relations in the 1970s.124  The pace and intensity of this engagement has 
fluctuated through administrations and in reaction to particular events in the US-China 
relationship.125 However, the stated goal of US strategy has remained to encourage a 
stronger and more open relationship with China. Cooperative security has therefore been 	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built around the preexisting pattern of engagement. The two approaches are in fact part of 
the same effort, as David Shambaugh writes: “Engagement, in and of itself, should not be 
the policy goal. Rather, it is a process and a vehicle to the ultimate goal of integrating 
China into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and normative international 
system.”126 This integration of China is precisely the goal of a strategy of cooperative 
security. Cooperative security can be considered as an expanded approach to the 
longstanding US engagement of China—an approach that is focused on military and 
security relations that utilize the systemic design of multilateralism. General engagement 
of China does not constitute cooperative security. The introduction of a military and 
security dimension to engagement, in addition to the developing multilateralism 
demonstrated above, together show the intension to build an inclusive security 
environment in East Asia.  
 The subtle difference between the engagement strategy started by Nixon 
and the one that fits within cooperative security can be seen in the US position on 
growing Chinese military power. Reflecting the relatively recent growth of Chinese 
capabilities, NSS publications throughout the 1990s and the first two QDRs in 1997 and 
2001 make little to know mention of Chinese military power.127 Little can be gleaned 
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from these reports other than that Chinese military investment and growth had not yet 
reached the forefront of American strategic concerns.128 
 This began to change during the Bush Administration. The 2002 NSS 
continued the standard rhetoric of engagement and claimed to “welcome the emergence 
of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China.”129 This statement was followed by a 
warning that, “in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors 
in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will 
hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.”130 The message was clear that the “strong” 
China that the US welcomes is not one of military strength. The 2006 QDR gave a 
similar assessment and warned that “the pace and scope of China’s military build-up 
already puts regional military balances at risk.”131 These statements are not particularly 
alarmist or condemning and are far from the hostile language used to describe the Soviet 
military developments during the Cold War. They do not, however, fit entirely into the 
discourse of cooperative security. They do not represent a strategy of including China as 
an equal contributor and beneficiary of a system of interdependence. They are more 
closely in line with a strategy of preponderance that promotes an East Asian security 
community in which stability among states is backed solely by US military power. 
 By 2010 the tone of language used to discuss Chinese military power in 
US strategy had changed noticeably. President Obama’s first NSS once again welcomed 
a stronger China, but this time included Chinese “responsible leadership” as a 	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development the United States supports.132 The document contains no remarks of concern 
regarding China’s military build-up, mentioning only that the US will continue to 
monitor its modernization. The 2010 QDR went a step farther in this change of tone, and 
acknowledged the useful contribution that a more advanced Chinese military could make 
to the region. It states: “China’s military has begun to develop new roles, missions, and 
capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests, which could enable it 
to play a more substantial and constructive role in international affairs.”133 Upgrading the 
envisioned role of China in the international system from participant to leader and 
recognizing the potential benefits of a stronger Chinese military are developments that 
fundamentally conflict with the three realist strategies of responding to China’s rise. They 
conform only with an understanding that does not assume China is an unavoidable 
adversary.  
 
 There are two important issues to address with the analysis provided in 
this chapter. The first deals specifically with understanding the United States’ response to 
China’s military modernization and growth. That the Obama administration has decided 
to advance the strategy of cooperative security, and therefore forgo efforts to contain 
China’s increasing power and influence, does not commit the US to inaction in 
countering Chinese capabilities. Nor does such countering by the US imply that their 
proclaimed strategy of cooperative security is disingenuous. Cooperative security, and the 
liberal theory behind it, does not promote the idea that mutually beneficial peace is 
ensured—only that it is possible. As Jervis explained: liberals see a world of “unrealized 	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or potential cooperation.”134 Achieving this cooperation is not taken for granted. It would 
be utopian to expect that by simply advancing multilateralism and inclusivity the United 
States would no longer need to worry about China’s military power, especially before 
such efforts are fully accepted and reciprocated by the Chinese. Although Powel and 
Snidel argue that positive sum cooperation can be the rational choice for actors under 
anarchy, they each provide specific conditions that make this possible.135 These 
conditions—namely interdependence and multilateralism—must be established before 
cooperative security can be expected to maintain stability among states. For this reason, 
the development of US military capabilities and tactics to counter the perceived threat 
from China’s military does not contradict a strategy of cooperative security.136  
 The second issue to be addressed is the value of assessing strategic 
documents and statements. As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the NSS and 
QDR are the most important official channels for an administration to present its foreign 
policy strategy. They provide guidance for members of the government and military in 
conducting their affairs, and make commitments to the American people. Although 
classified versions of these documents are produced to provide greater details of 
capabilities and means of achieving the goals outlined, the public releases should not be 
discounted in their ability to provide an understanding of US interests. It is very unlikely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See note 85. 
135 Powel mentions a sufficiently high cost of conflict and Snidel emphasizes multiple actors. See page 22-
24 of this paper. 
136 This references in particular the efforts to counter China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities. The US has adopted the operational concept of AirSea Battle for this specific purpose. See: 
U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),” (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense 2012). This dual approach has been labeled “hedging” by some, including John 
Hemmings, “Hedging: The Real U.S. Policy Towards China?,” The Diplomat, May 13, 2013. Hemmings 
says that hedging is a mix of engagement and balancing. His view does not directly conflict with the 
argument in this paper as cooperative security can be seen as the type of engagement being undertaken in 
addition to balancing. 
47	  	  
that the classified versions of the NSS and QDR contain a radically different picture of 
the US strategy for China, such as that of containment.137 Containment, like many 
strategies in international relations, relies on a clear communication of intentions to allies 
and enemies alike. For key mechanisms such as deterrence to work, allies must know, or 
at least believe, that the US is committed to their defense. Enemies must similarly be 
convinced. Indeed, the US policy of containment towards the Soviets was a very public 
affair.138 The value of analyzing documents such as the NSS and QDR therefore lies not 
only in their depiction of US strategy, but also in their role in signaling American 
intentions and expectations to the rest of the world. 
 Of course, regardless of how accurate the public statements and 
publications of American strategic goals are, a strategy is ultimately only meaningful if it 
is acted upon. This chapter has presented the roadmap the United States is using in 
dealing with the rise of China. The next chapter will discuss how the US has followed 
this map within the context of military and security relations. The evolving use of 
multilateral military training exercises in East Asia by the United States military is given 
as evidence of the cooperative security strategy identified here. 
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IV. Multilateral Military Training Exercises 
 
 
 Cooperative security is a comprehensive strategy that includes several aspects of 
international relations. A mutually beneficial system of multilateralism and inclusivity 
must be based in political, security, and economic interactions, and even to a lesser extent 
cultural exchange.139 Critics of this strategy, and liberalism in general, are particularly 
skeptical of the ability of states to cooperate on issues of national security. John 
Mearsheimer argues that liberalism simply cannot discuss issues of security, in which 
relative gains considerations are overpowering.140 Although Mearsheimer is also dubious 
of cooperation in economic trade that could be considered strategically significant, he 
acknowledges that there is more room for shared interests in this field. To demonstrate 
that the United States has adopted a strategy of cooperative security, focus should 
therefore be given to the developing state of US defense diplomacy in East Asia.  
Defense diplomacy—a concept once regarded as an oxymoron141—has been 
defined as “the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related security 
infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a tool of foreign security policy.”142 This 
can include a broad range of exchanges between the militaries and civilian defense 	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administrations of two or more countries. To put this into the context of the previous 
chapter, while the cooperative security strategy outlined in the NSS documents is 
intended to utilize all elements of national power, including defense diplomacy, 
cooperative security as it exists in the QDR is focused solely on this aspect. This chapter 
will discuss a component of defense diplomacy that has been used extensively as part of 
the US push towards cooperative security in East Asia. An analysis of the changing 
nature of US-lead multilateral military training exercises in the region is given as 
evidence of the strategy identified in the previous chapter.  
 US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently wrote in an op-ed article 
that as part of its efforts to help build a “vibrant regional security architecture” in East 
Asia, “the United States military will increase its role in cooperative security efforts and 
exercises as we continue to shift forces and operational focus.”143 Hagel has previously 
expressed that the expansion of joint exercises with other nations in the region is an 
instrumental component of the rebalancing effort.144 Former Secretary of Defense Leone 
Panetta similarly emphasized the key role that multilateral military-military ties play in 
the US strategy and made commitments to expand exercises with other nations.145 Similar 
comments by the Obama administration on the importance of military exercises and 
strengthening regional military relationships have been made both as part of the 
rebalancing strategy and before its inception. These initiatives represent the most literal 	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144 Nicole Grim, “Hagel says joint exercise expansion key to Asia Pacific pivot,” Defense Systems, August 
26, 2013, accessed March 11, 2014: (http://defensesystems.com/articles/2013/08/26/hagel-asia-
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Post, June 1, 2012, accessed March 11, 2014: (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/panetta-
arrives-in-singapore-for-conference-with-asian-leaders/2012/06/01/gJQAxdul6U_story.html). 
50	  	  
and direct behavior consistent with the goals of cooperative security. However, much like 
the discourse of engagement introduced in the previous chapter, the design of the 
multilateral exercises promoted by the United States provided insight as to their strategic 
purpose. 
 This chapter will introduce the two largest and most prominent US 
multilateral training exercises in the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) area of 
responsibility (AOR).146 These two are Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), and Cobra Gold. 
Each of these exercises started as multilateral operations well before the trend towards a 
cooperative security in reaction to China’s rise. The changes they have undergone 
recently are therefore particularly useful for understanding the use of multilateral training 
exercises in the current US strategy is Asia. 
 
 The RIMPAC exercise is the largest international maritime exercise in the 
world. RIMPAC 2012 involved 42 surface ships, six submarines, more than 200 aircraft, 
and over 25,000 personnel from 22 countries. 147  Held biennially in the waters off the 
Hawaiian Islands, RIMPAC began in 1971 and is hosted by the US Third Fleet. Although 
the type of drills and scenarios have changed over the years, exercises have included 
“amphibious operations; gunnery, missile, anti-submarine and air defense exercises as 
well as counter-piracy, mine clearance operations, explosive ordnance disposal and 	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Asia.  PACOM includes about one-fifth of the total US military strength. See: “USPACOM Facts,” United 
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diving and salvage operations.”148 The exercise also includes less flashy sessions on 
general navigation and communication standards. More recently RIMPAC has also 
included search and rescue, disaster relief, and other humanitarian crisis components.149  
 For the first two decades of RIMPAC’s history it remained relatively 
small. Participation fluctuated between three or four close US allies, which at various 
times included Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan.150 Beginning in the 1990s the 
exercise began to slowly expand to include other US allies. Although New Zealand 
dropped out of the exercise until joining again in 2012, South Korea was added in 
1990,151 Chile in 1996,152 Peru in 2002,153 and the United Kingdom in 2004.154 In 2008 
for the first time two new countries were added in the same year with the participation of 
Singapore and the Netherlands, brining the total up to ten.155 The following RIMPAC 
expanded even more rapidly with the addition of Colombia, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Commander, U.S. Third Fleet Public Affairs, “RIMPAC exercises to begin June 29,” Commander, U.S. 
Third Fleet, May 8, 2012, accessed December 22, 2014: (http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/000846). 
149 Daniel Taylor, “Everyone’s Invited: Record turnout for this year’s RIMPAC emphasizes growing focus 
on region,” Seapower 55:12 (2012), 39. 
150 Information on select years: (1977): “Wabash,” Naval Historical Center, accessed December 20, 2014: 
(http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/w1/wabash-`htm); (1982-1986): Ranginui Walker and William 
Sutherland, “The Pacific: Peace, Security and the Nuclear Issue,” (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 
1988), 55.  
151 Liam Stoker, RIMPAC 2012: Great Green Fleet, communications and Yellow Sea security,” naval-
technology.com, June 12, 2012, accessed December 22, 2013: (http://www.naval-
technology.com/features/featurerimpac2012-great-green-fleet-communications-korea/) 
152(1994): Mark Cunningham “USS Independence (CV 62) 35th Anniversary Cruise Book 1993-94,” 
(Anaheim, CA: Walworth Publishing, 1995), accessed December 20, 2014: 
(http://navysite.de/cruisebooks/cv62-94/index_041.htm), 493; (1996): Department of the Navy, “USS 
COWPENS (CG 63): FPO AP 96662-1183,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed December 
23, 2014: (http://www.history.navy.mil/shiphist/c/cg-63/1996.pdf), 3. 
153 Barbara Bailey, “RIMPAC 2002 Ends: Allies Head Home,” Department of the Navy, August 29, 2002, 
accessed December 23, 2014: (http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=2889). 
154 Barrie Barber, “RIMPAC 2004 Packs A Punch In Joint Exercise Near Hawaii,” Department of the Navy, 
June 30, 2004, accessed December 23, 2014: (http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=14004). 
155 “RIMPAC 2008,” Australian Department of Defence, accessed December 23, 2014: 
(http://www.defence.gov.au/opex/exercises/rimpac08/index.htm). 
52	  	  
and Thailand.156 Then in 2012 the exercise once again grew significantly. Reaching more 
than double the number of participating countries of only four years prior, RIMPAC 2012 
saw the addition of India, Russia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, and Tonga.157  
 The growth of the RIMPAC exercise clearly reflects the US strategic trend 
in the Asia-Pacific. After RIMPAC 2012, PACOM Commander Adm. Samuel J. 
Locklear promoted the exercise as “an excellent example of the large, multilateral efforts 
we are working to achieve.”158 Locklear reiterated that such multilateral cooperation is a 
“cornerstone of PACOM’s rebalancing efforts in the region.”159 In addition to the sheer 
number of participants in recent years, the specific countries involved demonstrate a shift 
in the strategic purpose of RIMPAC. Initially only open to close US allies, RIMPAC 
began as an exercise primarily focused on improving the warfighting capabilities of the 
United States and potential coalition partners. Although it has not lost that purpose today, 
participation by new security partners such as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well a 
potential strategic rival such as Russia, indicate that a greater emphasis is being placed on 
the “social” aspect of building relationships between militaries. This was further evident 
during the most recent RIMPAC in the decision to grant “command responsibilities” to 
select allies for the first time.160 The move further legitimized the US claim that it is 
aiming to mold a truly multilateral security environment. 
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 Although the final list of participants for RIMPAC 2014 has not yet been 
made available, the most significant addition that has been confirmed is the decision by 
China to send a ship to join in the upcoming exercise. The invitation of China by former 
Secretary Panetta following RIMPAC 2012 received significant attention on both sides of 
the Pacific.161 While the move was praised in China, some commenters in the US, 
including several members of Congress, were baffled as to why a “potential enemy” 
would be welcomed to cooperate in a military setting.162 In a January, 2014 hearing of the 
House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Joe Courtney stated that he found the invitation 
of China “extraordinary,” and asked the DoD Director of Strategic Plans and Policy Vice 
Adm. Pandolfe to explain the reasoning and purpose behind the decision. Pandolfe 
responded: 
 
“The invitation for the Chinese to participate in the 2014 RIMPAC is part of the 
larger set of initiatives to engage China; to try to continue to integrate them into the 
family of nations as they become more prosperous. And to expose them to the 
international norms by which the family of nations respects each other and cooperates in 
the international commons.”163 
 
 
Pandolfe’s use of the term “family of nations” harkens back to the post-War 
period when the phrase was commonly associated with the Marshall Plan to build a new 
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European community.164 Congress does not seem to have bought in to the likening 
however, as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Rep. Randy Forbes has 
since introduced an amendment to the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) that would require the Secretary of the Navy to brief Congress on the “intended 
scope of PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] participation in RIMPAC 2014” and 
on the compliance of Chinese cooperation with the FY2000 NDAA.165 The FY2000 
NDAA prohibits military-military exchange with China that may compromise national 
security by exposing US capabilities or operations—a restriction has been cited in the 
past as to why China had not been invited to join RIMPAC sooner.166 US military leaders 
have ensured that China’s participation in RIMPAC would be limited to less sensitive 
exercises.167 
 Although congressional oversight, and in this case disapproval, can 
hamper the Obama administration’s strategy of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific, 
ultimately in the case of RIMPAC the president and DoD have had enough leeway to 
make the exercise a prime example of the wide multilateral and inclusive approach being 
pursued. The inclusion of China in the US Navy’s largest and most visible multilateral 
exercise is unmistakably intended to send a message to Chinese leaders. The message is 	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one that has already been formulated in statements and publications of American 
strategy: the United States welcomes a more cooperative and engaged rising China. 
  
  The trends evident in the evolution of RIMPAC are also observable in 
other multilateral training exercises in the PACOM AOR. Cobra Gold is a major joint 
operation hosted annually in Thailand by the Royal Thai and United States militaries. The 
exercise began in 1982 as a bilateral effort to improve interoperability between the two 
countries’ armed forces.168 Initially conducted between the Royal Thai Navy and Air 
Force and the US Navy and Marine Corps, the US Army became involved in 1984 and 
has since taken on alternating executive responsibilities with the Marine Corps.169 Like 
RIMPAC, Cobra Gold has been expanding in recent years and in 2014 involved over 
14,000 participants from seven participating countries and over 20 other observer 
nations.170  
 The month-long Cobra Gold operation can be separated into three 
categories of exercises: humanitarian and civic, staff/command, and field training. The 
first of these three involves actual operations of providing humanitarian aid to the people 
of Thailand.171 This can include engineering and construction, medical care provision, or 
other cooperative service projects. The goal is to hone logistical skills and 	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interoperability, build personal relationships between participating countries, and 
providing a benefit to the local communities. The second group of exercises involves 
planning or participation in simulated or computer generated command and control (C2) 
crisis scenarios. This includes STAFFEX, during which time participants plan the 
operational exercise scenario for the following year.172 The goal of the C2 exercises is 
once again to enhance interoperability and build personal relationships. The final 
category of exercises in Cobra Gold is field training. These are the standard wargames 
and combat exercises that come to mind, with the addition of simulated non-combat 
scenarios such as natural disaster relief. Cobra Gold packs an impressive itinerary of 
amphibious landings, live-fire exercises, strategic airdrops, and jungle survival.173 
Together all three of these exercise categories are coordinated across multiple military 
branches and between nations with language and cultural barriers. The end product is 
surely a learning experience for those involved. 
Cobra Gold first expanded from its bilateral beginnings to include Singapore in 
2000.174 At the time, officials involved in the exercise explained that the addition of 
Singapore was intended to make the training “more realistic,” help build stronger 
relations, improve combat readiness, and “demonstrate U.S. resolve to support friends 
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and allies in the region.”175 The next permanent entrants were Japan in in 2005 and 
Indonesia in 2006.176 With their addition Rear Adm. Victor Guilloy of the US 7th Fleet 
stated that the expanded exercise was “a prime example of the Navy's strategy of 
partnership and coalition, as we create the building blocks to fight this global war on 
terrorism into the future.”177 The last two countries to be added as full participants in 
Cobra Gold were South Korea in 2010 and Malaysia in 2011.178  
 At first glance Cobra Gold does not seem to provide as strong of evidence 
of a trend towards cooperative security as is seen in RIMPAC. The growth in number of 
participating countries has been modest and, most noticeably, the key regional powers of 
China, India, and Russia seem to be excluded. In fact several of the United States’ closest 
allies in the region are also missing. Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines have all 
traditionally had much closer military ties with the US than Indonesia or Malaysia. The 
answers to these objections can be found in a more detailed look at the participation and 
design of the Cobra Gold exercise. Given that Cobra Gold is co-hosted by Thailand and 
takes place within their borders, the United States must take a more measured and 
nuanced approach to adapting the exercise into its strategy of cooperative security. 
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 While, officially, the number of participating nations in Cobra Gold has 
not changed in the passed four years, in reality the exercise is becoming increasingly 
multilateral in nature. The confusion arises from how different attendees are classified. 
States designated as “participating” are only those that participate in all thee portions of 
the exercise. All other nations that attend are designated as “observers.” The concept of 
inviting observing nations to attend a training exercise is not new. Often states are invited 
to observe first before they are invited to join the exercise.179 Though many observers 
never end up attending as participants. In most cases “observer” is used quite literally, 
and those are invited to do so engage very little in the exercise itself. Beginning roughly a 
decade ago, a new observer status was offered for Cobra Gold that was much more 
proactive than before.  
States that participate in the initiative known as the Multinational Planning 
Augmentation Team (MPAT), have been allowed to engage in certain portions of the C2 
exercises at Cobra Gold.180 MPAT was started in 2000 as an informal multilateral effort 
to increase the ability of partner militaries to “respond with greater speed, effectiveness, 
interoperability and unity of effort for small-scale contingencies and missions that can be 
characterized as military operations other than war.”181 Although PACOM provides 
funding and office space for MPAT, it is not technically part of the US military or any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 In the case of Cobra Gold, both South Korea and Malaysia were invited to observe the 2009 exercises 
before they were invited to join the in following years. Crista Yazzie, “Cobra Gold 09 kicks off in 
Thailand,” U.S. Army, February 9. 2009, accessed January 11, 2014: 
(http://www.army.mil/article/16415/Cobra_Gold_09_kicks_off_in_Thailand/). 
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other governing body. Run entirely by volunteers that work in their respective military, 
government, or even NGO, MPAT is essentially an international crisis response club. 
With close relations to PACOM, MPAT has been integrated into military exercises 
throughout the Asia-Pacific, included Cobra Gold. This has allowed observer nations that 
are affiliated with MPAT to play a growing role in the humanitarian and disaster relief 
C2 exercises and simulations, without becoming full participating members of Cobra 
Gold.  
In 2008 the group of MPAT observers included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, 
France, Malaysia, Mongolia, and the Philippines.182 These countries were able to 
participate in the Coalition Task Force, and United Nations Force Command Post 
Exchange exercises. Both exercises involve cooperative planning, coordinating, and 
executing simulated humanitarian missions.183 Not only does this provide the 
participating nations with an invaluable opportunity to practice natural disaster scenarios 
that are all to common in the Asia-Pacific region, it also presents a close-quarters, high-
stress environment in which trust and communication between groups Is essential.  
By 2012, the MPAT observers included Australia, France, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Bangladesh, Italy, India, Nepal, the Philippines, and Vietnam.184 In addition to 
the seven participating countries and the handful of strictly observing nations, nearly the 
entire Asia-Pacific region is involved in Cobra Gold. China, which has been a normal 	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3, 2014: (http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BANGKOK1670_a.html). 
183 Jovane Holland, “III Marine Expeditionary Force / Marine Corps Installations Pacific,” Defense Video 
and Imagery Distribution System, February 23, 2010, accessed April 3, 2014: 
(http://www.dvidshub.net/news/45760/cobra-gold-commences#.U14iPq1dVIA); “Command Post Exercise 
(CPX),” Globalsecurity.org, accessed April 3, 2014: (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cpx.htm). 
184 U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs, “Chafee and Tortuga Support 31st MEU at Cobra Gold 2012,” Department 
of the Navy, February 12, 2012, accessed April 3, 2014: 
(http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65265).  
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observer for over a decade, has not joined the volunteer force of the MPAT and has 
repeatedly expressed concerns about such a large exercise right on its doorstep.185 
Understandably, from the Chinese point of view, expanding US multilateralism and the 
promise of cooperative security are not very reassuring when one national is 
conspicuously left out. Of course, the restrictions in the FY2000 NDAA would make full 
participation by China unfeasible. However, in the past year the decision was made to 
extend a new type of participation level, “observer-plus,” to China for Cobra Gold 
2014.186 In the recently concluded exercise, China sent seventeen soldiers to participate in 
humanitarian and civic exercises, as well as parts of the staff/command training. Similar 
to the reaction after the invitation for China to join RIMPAC, one Chinese academic has 
called the move “ground-breaking.”187  
In a leaked diplomatic cable sent from the US embassy in Bangkok in 2008, the 
Cobra Gold exercise is described as: “vital to our strategic interests in Asia, including 
advancing regional security cooperation and engagement, strengthening our joint and 
combined capabilities and readiness, and posturing forces for agile and responsive 
deployment.”188 Although the cable doesn’t mention China, it repeatedly stresses the 
value of expanding multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. It 
commends the recent inclusion of five full participants and seven MPAT observers in 
Cobra Gold 2008, and suggests that new participants are in the works. In a more candid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	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  accessed	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setting, it demonstrates the strategic vision that was only beginning to be articulated at 
the highest levels of government. In the six years since that cable was sent, the claims it 
made have been strengthened. The United States has not only remained committed to the 
multilateral platform of Cobra Gold, it as has broadened and deepened its reach. An 
invitation for Burma to observe the exercise for the first time in 2013, followed by the 
invitation for China to participate the following year, both demonstrate a clear intention 
to seek true multilateralism, not simply an American coalition. Even as commentators 
continues to question the true nature of the US strategy for China, or argue that it is some 
form of containment 2.0, evidence to the contrary can be seen in the major mechanism of 
United States defense diplomacy and security cooperation in East Asia. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
It would not be unreasonable to raise the criticism that this chapter cherry picks 
which military exercises to discuss. Looking for a strategy of multilateralism within the 
two largest multilateral exercises in the word could come across as a bit too convenient. 
After all, in almost every statement or publication by US officials on the strategy in East 
Asia, the first point made is that America’s bilateral relationships in the region are the 
“cornerstone” of stability. With each one of these five treaty partners—Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia—the US has a long history of bilateral 
exercises. Most of these, with the exception of Thailand’s Cobra Gold, have remained 
bilateral, and of great importance to American military forces. 
This seemingly fundamental image of US military strategy and force structure in 
East Asia is what makes new developments outside this established formula so important. 
The hub and spoke system is so engrained in the history of the US alliance structure that 
each step away from it, each year that more resources and political capital is spent 
towards building a more robust multilateral system, reveals more about the long term 
strategic vision of the US. Stepping away, however, is not exactly what the US is doing. 
Just as Secretary Hagel and others have emphasized to allies elsewhere in the world that 
the rebalancing to Asia does not mean abandoning US commitments, the rebalancing to 
cooperative security does not mean an abandoning of the strong bilateral relations in East 
Asia. To do so would be counterproductive, and surely result in greater instability. The 
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theory behind cooperative security, however, is that if it is truly successful, those old 
bilateral relationships will no longer be needed.  
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AOR                                                             Area of Responsibility  
CARAT                Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
C2                                            Command and Control 
MPAT                Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 
NDAA                  National Defense Authorization Act 
NSS                    National Security Strategy 
PACOM               Pacific Command 
PLA              People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN              People’s Liberation Army Navy 
QDR                   Quadrennial Defense Review 
RIMPAC               Rim of the Pacific  
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